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THE REJECTION OF LAND WARFARE
The Diaries of Edmund Ironside, appointed Chief of the Imperial General Staff at the British Declaration of War, describe the British War plan for defeating Germany:
“In spite of the pre-war work of the Committee of Imperial Defence… and in spite of the efforts of the War Cabinet, there was little co-ordination or co-operation between the fighting services. The Air thought they could win the war by bombing Germany, and built many large bombers which could only work well at night. Co-operation with the Army was regarded with little favour and suitable machines were scarce. The Navy thought of blockading Germany, and the Government hoped that victory could be won by bombing and blockade.” (The Ironside Diaries 1937-40, p.100)
Only General Ironside maintained that Britain would have to fight and defeat the Germany army to win the World War it had declared. In his diary entry for September 19 1939 he made it clear that the Air Ministry’s’s policy of bombing, and its refusal to put any effort into developing aircraft that would support the British Army in actually fighting the German Army, would be fatal:
“The Air Ministry is now working on a programme of big bombers costing 26,000 pounds a piece and God knows how many man-hours to build. They are not able to work with the Army and are used for this long-distance bombing against industry. The R.A.F. think they will win by themselves. I try to tell them that the Germans will use their army with their bombers to destroy the French Army, and if that goes the whole edifice of our defence goes too.” (p.140)
On October 1939, when RAF attacks on the Ruhr were discussed, Ironside recorded that the RAF’s bomber fleet was not really meant for the targeting of factories but had a wider objective against German civilians. It was being saved from military action for this later purpose:
“The Air Ministry is hypnotised by action against morale and will hear of nothing else. Their big bombers have been built for this purpose and will be wasted if used against smaller targets. They are afraid to use them against an advancing German Army for fear of all the A.A. defence they may meet…” (p.144)
The reason why the RAF did not bomb the Ruhr in 1939 was because the War Cabinet “did not want to be the first to take the gloves off” according to the Ironside Diaries (p. 146). The RAF were willing and able but the Government were unwilling at that moment to provoke the Germans into reprisal activity.
In 1939 the French Army was three-quarters the size of the German and Britain only needed to make up the deficiency through its massive resources of Empire. What was required was an Allied Army to hold off Germany’s main instrument of warfare and Hitler would be done. But the resources put into the construction of a Bomber fleet meant the British contribution to the military contest was limited and it was determined to fight a long war, with the bombers held back from action to save them for the later war of attrition. As Ironside noted: “The British Air had been developed at the expense of the British Army.” (p.122)
Ironside found the French stuck in defensive mode. Badly affected by the losses of the last War they could conceive of nothing but defence of France. At the same time they reasoned that Hitler could not wait forever on the frontier. But they had no thought of offence in them and passed the initiative to Hitler. Only Britain could disrupt the Germans with improvised offensive action to disperse their forces. But its strategy was inaction and the long war waged by the bomber.
Churchill in a Memo to his Minister of Aircraft Production, on 8 July 1940 wrote:
“When I look around to see how we can win the war I see that there is only one sure path. We have no Continental army which can defeat the German military power.. Should [Hitler].. not try invasion.. there is one thing that will bring him back and bring him down, and that is an absolutely devastating, exterminating attack by very heavy bombers from this country upon the Nazi homeland. We must be able to overwhelm them by this means, without which I do not see a way through. We cannot accept any aim lower than air mastery. When can it be obtained?” (W. Churchill The Second World War, Volume 2 Their Finest Hour, Appendix A)
The US, when it entered the War, wanted to fight toe to toe with the Nazis. The Americans wished to open up a second front as soon as possible after they entered the war in 1941. It was possible in the summer of 1942 to land a sizable force in France and open a second front. The British army had recuperated from 1940 and been reinforced by men and material from its Empire and the US. Large numbers of American and Canadian troops had joined them on the British Island and were ready for action. The Germans had a relatively small force defending thousands of miles of Atlantic coast, of considerably inferior quality to their forces on the Eastern Front.
There was a vital moment developing in the East in 1942. The Soviet ally was fighting for its life and the U.S. wished to aid her ally to the greatest extent through an attack on the continent to divert German forces. But Britain objected to making such a sacrifice on behalf of the Soviets. Churchill did not believe the Soviet Union would be capable of turning the tide and was in no hurry to help her. The Russians role was to bleed the Germans dry and be bled dry in the process so that the Western Allies, and in particular Britain, could pick up the pieces in victory. This is made very clear in R.W. Thompson’s 1959 book The Price of Victory.
As Thompson noted Arthur Harris and Bomber Command “believed simply that Overlord (an Allied landing on the continent) was unnecessary… Strategically, they declared, the bomber is winning the war. To divert the bomber from its strategic mission was old-fashioned and short-sighted. The German armies in the field, immensely powerful as they were, were nevertheless powerless to prevent the utter destruction of the homeland and people it was their role and purpose to defend” (The Price of Victory, pp. 124-5)
Churchill organised a suicide raid in which a large number of Canadians were sacrificed at Dieppe, to demonstrate the strength of the German defences. It helped deter the US and diverted them to the long way round to Berlin, via Italy. Another year was gained for the war of attrition waged on the German populace by Bomber Command and for the Russians and Germans to be bled dry in the exterminating battles in the East.